INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND DISCIPLINES
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection,
collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation
of collected information. It is a specialized information
product that provides the United States or an adversary with
information required to further its national interests. One of
the most important functions of intelligence is the reduction of
the ambiguity inherent in the observation of external activities.
In the most obvious case, adversary intelligence organizations
may seek information concerning military capabilities or other
matters that directly threaten the national security of the
United States. In other cases, adversary nations, or other
groups, may seek information about U.S. diplomatic negotiating
positions, economic programs, or proprietary information from
In each of these cases, the information sought may provide the
adversary with an edge and might allow him to implement a well-developed strategy to reach his goals. In most cases, the
development of an intelligence product involves collecting
information from a number of different sources. In some cases,
information may be disseminated immediately upon collection based
upon operational necessity and potential impact on current
operations. This type of raw intelligence is usually based on
fragmentary information about fast-breaking events and may
contain substantial inaccuracies or uncertainties that must be
resolved through subsequent report and analysis. Finished
intelligence products contain information that is compared, analyzed, and weighted to allow the development of conclusions.
Finished intelligence is produced through analytical review in
the intelligence process. The intelligence process confirms a
fact or set of facts through a multiplicity of sources to reduce
the chance of erroneous conclusions and susceptibility to
Intelligence is divided into strategic and operational
intelligence. Strategic intelligence provides policy makers with
the information needed to make national policy or decisions of
long-lasting importance. Strategic intelligence collection often
requires integrating information concerning politics, military
affairs, economics, societal interactions, and technological
developments. It typically evolves over a long period of time and
results in the development of intelligence studies and estimates.
Operational intelligence is concerned with current or near-term
events. It is used to determine the current and projected
capability of a program or operation on an ongoing basis and does
not result in long-term projections. Most intelligence activities
support the development of operational intelligence. 
The Intelligence Cycle
The intelligence cycle is the process through which intelligence
is obtained, produced, and made available to users. In depicting
this cycle, the United States Intelligence Community uses a five-step process. Other nations may describe this cycle differently;
however, the process is largely the same. The steps in the
intelligence cycle are depicted in the following illustration:
Planning and Direction. The first step in the cycle, planning
and direction, involves the management of the entire intelligence
effort, from the identification of a need for data to the final
delivery of the intelligence product to the consumer. The process
consists of identifying, prioritizing, and validating
intelligence requirements, translating requirements into
observables, preparing collection plans, issuing requests for
information collection, production, and dissemination, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data. In this
step specific collection capabilities are tasked, based on the
type of information required, the susceptibility of the targeted
activity to various types of collection activity, and the availability of collection assets.
Collection. The second step, collection, includes both
acquiring information and provisioning that information to processing and production elements. The collection process
encompasses the management of various activities, including
developing collection guidelines that ensure optimal use of
available intelligence resources. Intelligence collection
requirements are developed to meet the needs of potential
consumers. Based upon identified intelligence, requirements
collection activities are given specific taskings to collect
information. These taskings are generally redundant and may use a
number of different intelligence disciplines for collection
activities. Tasking redundancy compensates for the potential loss
or failure of a collection asset. It ensures that the failure of
a collection asset is compensated for by duplicate or different
assets capable of answering the collection need. The use of
different types of collection systems contributes to redundancy.
It also allows the collection of different types of information
that can be used to confirm or disprove potential assessments.
Collection operations depend on secure, rapid, redundant, and
reliable communications to allow for data exchange and to provide
opportunities for cross-cueing of assets and tip-off exchanges
between assets. Once collected, information is correlated and
forwarded for processing and production.
Processing. The third step, processing, is the conversion of
collected information into a form suitable for the production of
intelligence. In this process, incoming information is converted
into formats that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in
producing intelligence. Processing may include such activities as
translation and reduction of intercepted messages into written
format to permit detailed analysis and comparison with other
information. Other types of processing include video production,
photographic processing, and correlation of information collected
by technical intelligence platforms.
Production. The fourth step, production, is the process of
analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and integrating raw data and
information into finished intelligence products for known or
anticipated purposes and applications. The product may be
developed from a single source or from all-source collection and
databases. To be effective, intelligence production must focus on
the consumer’s needs. It should be objective, timely, and most
importantly accurate. As part of the production process, the
analyst must eliminate information that is redundant, erroneous,
or inapplicable to the intelligence requirement. As a result of
the analytical effort, the analyst may determine that additional
collection operations are required to fill in gaps left by
previous collection or existing intelligence databases. The final
intelligence product must provide the consumer with an
understanding of the subject area, and draw analytical
conclusions supported by available data.
Dissemination. The final step of the intelligence cycle is
dissemination. Dissemination is the conveyance of intelligence to
the consumer in a usable form. Intelligence can be provided to
the consumer in a wide range of formats including verbal reports,
written reports, imagery products, and intelligence databases.
Dissemination can be accomplished through physical exchanges of
data and through interconnected data and communications
The OPSEC program manager should be aware of the intelligence
cycle for three reasons. First, this awareness allows the manager
to play a role in the production of intelligence required to
support his OPSEC program. The OPSEC program manager must be
aware of the range of threats that confront his program, or he
will not be able to implement countermeasures to deny the
adversary access to data that may provide critical information.
Knowledge of the intelligence cycle and the various Intelligence
Community organizations allows the OPSEC program manager to
determine how to access intelligence needed for conduct of the
Second, knowledge of the intelligence cycle allows the OPSEC
program manager to develop protective measures to thwart adversary collection activities. Knowledge of adversary intelligence
planning derived through U.S. intelligence collection allows the
OPSEC program manager to determine if his facility, operation, or
program is targeted, or is likely to be targeted, by a particular
adversary. Knowledge of an adversary’s collection methods and
patterns allows the program manager to develop effective
countermeasures that hide or distort indicators.
Finally, a knowledge of the adversary’s analytical biases can be
used to develop deception programs that deceive the adversary by
confirming erroneous perceptions. The following section of this
handbook examines the various intelligence collection disciplines
and considers their use by adversaries against the United States.
Intelligence Collection Disciplines
Several intelligence disciplines are used by adversaries to
acquire information concerning the United States. These
disciplines include human intelligence HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and
signatures intelligence (MASINT), and open source intelligence
(OSINT). Each of these disciplines is used by adversaries against
the United States to some degree. Most nations, and many subnational and private organizations, have HUMINT capabilities that
they use to collect data on their adversaries and competitors.
Open source intelligence is successful in targeting the United
States because of the openness of American society. Technical and
professional journals are often lucrative sources for information
concerning government and commercial activities in the United
States. The growing number of on-line databases has increased the
capacity of U.S. adversaries and competitors to develop tailored
data products on U.S. government and industry activities by
permitting them to review large quantities of information in very
short periods of time. Search parameters used for these databases
can be structured to extract only pertinent information for
Open source collection becomes more of a threat as more
information becomes electronically accessible. OPSEC program
managers must be aware of the potential for open source
collection against their activities and must ensure that
protective countermeasures are developed to prevent inadvertent
compromise of program activities through publication of data in publicly available media.
Intelligence collection organizations may also use IMINT, SIGINT,
and MASINT to gather data. These collection capabilities,
however, are often limited by the technological capabilities of
the intelligence organization. Historically, less technologically
capable nations have been unable to gain access to information;
however, this situation is changing. SIGINT technologies are
proliferating throughout the world and are being sold by a wide
variety of suppliers to nations that are known adversaries of the
United States. Imagery products are becoming more readily
available to non-traditional adversaries as commercial imagery
products that approach the quality of intelligence collection
systems become available for sale. MASINT, however, is still a
relatively arcane collection discipline and only a limited number
of nations have access to MASINT collection capabilities. The
following sections discuss each of the collection disciplines and
the type of information collected.
Human intelligence is derived from human sources. To the
public, HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine
activities, yet, in reality, most HUMINT collection is performed
by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches.
HUMINT is the oldest method for collecting information about a
foreign power. Until the technical revolution of the mid to late
twentieth century, HUMINT the primary source of intelligence for
all governments. For most nations in the world, it remains the
mainstay of their intelligence collection activities. HUMINT
includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the
individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these
Overt activities are performed openly. Overt HUMINT collectors
can include military attaches, diplomatic personnel, members of
official delegations, and debriefers at refugee centers. Overt
HUMINT activities may include: exploiting unclassified
publications, conference materials, and Congressional hearings;
operating interrogation centers for refugees and prisoners of
war; and debriefing legal travelers who traveled to countries of
interest to a nation’s intelligence service. Sensitive HUMINT
activities may depend upon the same methods as overt activities,
however, the sponsor of the activity must be protected from
disclosure. Disclosure of the sponsor’s identity may result in
political embarrassment, compromise of other intelligence
operations, or security threats to the sponsoring nation.
Clandestine HUMINT sources include agents who have been recruited
or have volunteered to provided information to a foreign nation,
and foreign nationals who successfully infiltrate an organization
with a cover story. The latter cases are fairly rare, and
generally come to the United States under the guise of being
political refugees. Once in the United States, they move into
positions that allow them to gather political, technical, or
economic information for their governments.
According to one estimate, over 100 countries currently conduct
intelligence operations against the United States. Adversary
intelligence organizations place a high priority on the
acquisition of scientific and technical information and target
the United States because of its preeminence in many high-technology areas. The United States Government, American
corporations, and U.S. universities have been targeted by
intelligence organizations seeking scientific and technical
intelligence. The United States hosts more science and technology
(S&T) officials, defense attaches, and identified intelligence
officers than any other industrialized nation in the world.
Intrusive on-site inspection activities required under some arms
control agreements provide a significant opportunity for HUMINT
collection at facilities of great importance to the national
security of the United States. On-site inspection provisions are
specified in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Bilateral
Agreement between the United States and Russia on Chemical
Weapons, and in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE). In addition, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and the Open Skies
Treaty (OS) provide the opportunity to gather information from
sensitive installations, even though no intrusive on-site
inspections are permitted. These treaties provide for the use of
technical collection capabilities to verify national
declarations. The operation of these collection systems requires
a significant number of support personnel, and some of these
personnel are likely to be intelligence collectors. Intelligence
collectors in onsite inspections will be accredited inspectors
who are specially trained to collect specific types of data and
enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is likely that these personnel will
try to obtain intelligence through observation of facilities,
elicitation of information from escorts and facility personnel,
and collection of available documentation.
Even with the explosion of technical capabilities, HUMINT can
still provide information that even the most proficient technical
collectors cannot, such as access to internal memoranda and to
compartmented information. Most importantly, human collectors can
provide key insights into the intentions of an adversary, whereas
technical collection systems are often limited to determining
capabilities. HUMINT can be used to reveal adversary plans and
intentions, or uncover scientific and weapons developments before
they are used or are detected by technical collection systems.
HUMiNT can also provide documentary evidence such as blueprints
of facilities, copies of adversary plans, or copies of diplomatic
or policy documents. Finally, HUMINT is extremely cost effective
compared with technical collection systems and does not require a
significant technological production base for support.
Signals intelligence is derived from signal intercepts
comprising, either individually or in combination, all
communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence
(ELlNT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
(FISINT), however transmitted. COMINT, one of the primary
SIG[NT disciplines, includes information derived from intercepted
communications transmissions. COMINT targets voice and
teleprinter traffic, video, Morse code traffic, or even facsimile
messages. Assuming access is possible, COMINT can be collected
from the air waves, cable, fiber optics, or any other
transmission medium. ELINT includes the interception and analysis
of noncommunications transmissions, such as radar. ELlNT is used
to identify the location of an emitter, determine its
characteristics, and infer the characteristics of supported
systems. FISINT consists of intercepts of telemetry from an
opponent’s weapons systems as they are being tested. Telemetry
units provide designers with information on a prototype’s
guidance system operation, fuel usage, staging, and other
parameters vital for understanding operational characteristics.
These data enable the designer to evaluate the performance of the
prototype. However, if intercepted, they also provide an
adversary with the ability to estimate the capability of the
Signals intelligence collection can be performed from a variety
of platforms. Examples include overt ground collection sites,
such as the Russian facility at Lourdes, Cuba; ships and
aircraft; and covert locations inside the United States. SIGINT
facilities can monitor transmissions from communications
satellites, as well as terrestrial facilities. This is particularly important because many international transmissions
originating in the United States depend on communications
satellites for passage overseas. Communications satellites supporting the transmission of U.S. Government, private sector, and
public communications include the International Maritime
Satellite system ([NMARSAT), the International Telecommunications
Satellite system (INTELSAT),and the European Satellite system
(EUROSAT). International communications satellites are routinely
monitored by foreign intelligence services, including the Russian
and Chinese intelligence services. The majority of collection
capabilities targeting the United States are either ground or sea
based, and target line-of-site or satellite communication
systems. Space-based collection systems can also collect COMINT,
FISINT, and ELINT.
MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence information
obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived
from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying
any distinctive features associated with the source emitter or
sender. This information is then used to facilitate the
subsequent identification or measurement of the same type of
equipment. The term measurement refers primarily to the data
collected for the purpose of obtaining finite metric parameters.
The term signature refers primarily to data indicating the
distinctive features of phenomena, equipment, or objects as they
are sensed by the collection instrument. The signature is used to
recognize the phenomenon, equipment, or object when its
distinctive features are detected.
Examples of MASINT disciplines include radar intelligence
(RAD[NT), infrared intelligence (IRINT), and nuclear intelligence
(NUCINT). Because it works in different parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum, MASINT detects information patterns not
previously exploited by sensors. MASINT sensors collect
information generally considered by the targeted nation to be
peripheral in nature. As a result, these signatures are often not
protected by any countermeasures.
IMINT is a product of imagery analysis. Imagery includes
representations of objects reproduced electronically or by
optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other
media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar
sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. IMINT
includes the exploitation of data to detect, classify, and
identify objects or organizations. It can be produced from either
hard- or soft-copy (digital) imagery. Hard-copy imagery is synonymous with film, while soft-copy imagery is displayed on
electronic terminals. Both types of imagery sources can be
analyzed and interpreted for various purposes by different users.
At one time, the imagery intelligence threat was largely
restricted to the former Soviet Union and later to the Russian
Federation. This is no longer true. The proliferation of space-based imagery systems permits a much greater use of imagery
products by nations that previously did not have access to them.
Currently, imagery can be purchased from a variety of sensors.
These systems include the Landsat multispectral imagery (MSI)
system operated by the United States, the French SPOT MSI and
pan-chromatic imaging system, the European Space Agency’s ERS-1
synthetic aperture radar imaging system, and the Japanese JERS-1
multisensor imager. Additionally, the Russians are selling 2-meter or better imagery from their spacebased reconnaissance
systems. The commercial imagery market is likely to continue to
grow at an exponential rate, and additional collection systems
are currently being developed. These will include imaging systems
produced by U.S. companies that will be capable of producing 1-meter resolution electro-optical digitized imagery. One meter
imagery is sufficient to conduct technical analysis of terrain,
determine key facilities in an urban area, and conduct detailed
analyses of industrial facilities. Other nations such as France,
Germany, Japan, and Canada are producing advanced imagery
platforms that could be used to target sensitive facilities.
Existing imagery systems and developmental commercial systems
will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5. An additional
factor that must be considered is the growing availability of
sophisticated imagery work stations, and analytical tools. These
capabilities will allow adversaries to conduct in-depth analysis
for targeting and technical intelligence gathering.
The 1992 Open Skies Treaty also poses an imagery collection
threat. The treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial
observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories.
The treaty was negotiated between the members of NATO and the
former Warsaw Pact as a means to promote openness and
transparency of military forces and activities. Observation
flights can be performed from aircraft provided by the observing
nation, the observed nation, or a third participating party.
Aircraft can be equipped with panoramic and framing cameras
capable of a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters,
video cameras with a ground resolution of no better than 30
centimeters, infrared line scanning devices with ground
resolution of no better than 50 centimeters, and synthetic
aperture radar systems with impulse response rate resolutions no
better than 3 meters. Ground resolutions of 50 centimeters or
less provide significant detailed information for an imagery
analyst. Using the imagery derived from Open Skies flights
analysts will be able to identify particular types of equipment
by type and capability, and perform detailed analyses of rail,
port, industrial, and military facilities.
Imagery provides significant benefits to an adversary collecting
intelligence against the United States. First, properly
mensurated imagery can provide geolocation accuracies for weapons
systems targeting, or other intelligence collection platforms.
Second, imagery allows activity to be detected, target
characteristics studied in detail, and equipment and facilities
enumerated. Third, large areas can be covered by imagery sensors
for mapping of areas of key importances
Imagery also has limitations. Except for synthetic aperture
radar, imagery quality is normally degraded by darkness and
adverse weather. This allows the targeted organization to use
these periods of time to conduct activities that they wish to go
unobserved. If an organization is aware that it is being targeted
by imagery systems, they can use camouflage, concealment, and
deception (CC&D) techniques to obscure their activities or
provide a misleading image to the observing party. Effective use
of CC&D may result in the adversary drawing erroneous conclusions
about the observed organization’s capabilities and activities.
Finally, imagery intelligence collection usually requires a
technologically oriented infrastructure. While this requirement
may be lessened to some extent in the future, effective use of
imagery will still require well educated, technically competent
analysts — a capability that may be beyond some U.S.
Open source intelligence involves the use of materials available
to the public by intelligence agencies and other adversaries.
Some analysts have estimated that the Soviet Union derived up to
90 percent of its intelligence from open source information. With
the proliferation of electronic databases, it has become easier
to collate large quantities of data, and structure information to
meet the needs of the adversary collector. Open source
information can often provide extremely valuable information
concerning an organization’s activities and capabilities.
Frequently, open source material can provide information on
organizational dynamics, technical processes, and research
activities not available in any other form. When open source data
is compiled, it is often possible to derive classified data or
trade secrets. This is particularly true in the case of studies
published in technical journals. A significant understanding of
research and development efforts can often be derived by
analyzing journal articles published by different members of a
research organization. Finally, open source information is generally more timely and may be the only information available in
the early stages of a crisis or emergency.
Open source intelligence collection does have limitations. Often
articles in military or scientific journals represent a
theoretical or desired capability rather than an actual capability. Censorship may also limit the publication of key data
needed to arrive at a full understanding of an adversary’s
actions, or the press may be used as part of a conscious
Computer Intrusion for Collection Operations
It is unclear to what extent foreign intelligence services are
using computer hackers to obtain proprietary data or sensitive
government information, or whether they have developed the
capability to use computer intrusion techniques to disrupt
telecommunications activities. The KGB did, however, sponsor computer intrusion activities by the Hannover Hackers, and there is
no reason to believe that these efforts have ceased. The Hannover
Hackers were able to access at least 28 Government computer
systems, and obtain data from them. They sold this data to the
KGB. While none of this data was classified, much of it was
sensitive, and classified information could potentially be
derived from comparing this information with other data. It has
also been alleged that the KGB has been involved in similar
efforts with other hacker groups and that these operations
included the remote introduction of logic bombs and other
malicious code.  There is little doubt that many foreign
intelligence services could obtain hese capabilities if they
wished. The ability of a group of Dutch hackers to obtain
sensitive information from U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force
computer networks during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm serves as an example of this potential for access. Between
April 1990 and May 1991, this group was able to penetrate
computer systems at 34 different facilities. The group obtained
information on logistics operations, equipment movement
schedules, and weapons development programs. Information from one
of the penetrated computer systems directly supported Desert
Shield/Desert Storm operations. In a review of this incident the
General Accounting Office concluded that a foreign intelligence
service would have been able to derive significant understanding
of U.S. Operations in the Persian Gulf from the information that
the Dutch hackers were able to extract from DoD information
All Source Intelligence
The culmination of the intelligence cycle is the development of
all source intelligence. All source intelligence incorporates
information derived through HUMINT, SIGINT, IM[NT, MAS1NT, and
OStNT. The intention of this type of effort is to develop
reinforcing information and to use multiple sources to corroborate key data points. The advantage of an all source approach
is that each of the intelligence disciplines is suited to
collecting a particular type of data, which allows the intelligence organization to examine all facets of an intelligence
target, and gain a better understanding of its operation. All
source intelligence collection is the most formidable threat
faced by the OPSEC program manager. Fortunately, only a few
nations have the ability to mount such efforts. The following
sections of this report examines the intelligence capabilities of
adversary nations and groups.
1 – Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Compendium of OPSEC Terms,
Greenbelt, MD: IOSS, April 1991.
2 – Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, StraJegic
Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989.
3 – The Joint Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint
Operations, Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
June 30. 1991.
4 – Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Compendium of OPSEC Terms,
Greenbelt, MD: IOSS, April 1991.
5 – Air Force Pamphlet 200-18, Target Intelligence Handbook:
Unclassif ed Targeting Principles, Washington, DC: Department of
the Air Force, October 1, 1990.
6 – Suzanne Wood, Katherine L. Herbig, and Peter A. W. Lewis,
American Espionage, 1945-1989, Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel
Security Research and Education Center, 1990.
7 – Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the
Battlefield, Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, October 1994.
8 – Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target,
New York: William Morrow, 1987.
9 Intelligence Community Staff, Glossary of Intelligence Terms
and Definitions, Washington, DC: ICS, June 1989.
10 – William Rosenau,”A Deafening Silence: U.S. Policy and the
SIGINT Facility at Lourdes,” Intelligence and National Security,
9:4 (October 1994), pp. 723-734.
11 – Pan chromatic systems produce black and white imagery.
Multispectral systems capture selected visible and non-visible
wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum to develop images
that provide information not available from the visible spectrum
alone. These images provide the means to determine soil porosity,
moisture content, heat distribution patterns, structural density,
and vegetation growth. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) uses a
radar antenna with a narrow beam to develop a high resolution
image. SAR provides an all weather/day/night imaging capability.
Electro-optic imagery differs from optical imagery in that the
first uses an electrical system imaging system to obtain a
digital image, and the second type is essentially a photographic
system that uses film as a medium. The advantage of electro-optic
imagery is that digitized imagery can be transmitted for near
real-time analysis, and can be manipulated or enhanced to
emphasize desired features.
12 – Daniel B. Sibbet, “Commercial Remote-Sensing,” American
Intelligence Journal, Spring/Summer 1993, p. 37, and Testimony of
Robin Armani before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Public Hearing on Commercial Remote Sensing, November 17. 1993.
13 – On-Site Inspection Agency, “Fact Sheet: The Open Skies
Treaty,” May 1993, and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Treaty on Open Skies (Official Text), April 10, 1992.
14 – Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Target Intelligence Handbook:
Unclassified Targeting Principles, Air Force Pamphlet 200-18,
Volume 1, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1990, pp. 18-19.
15 – ibid.. P. 19.
16 – Peter Warren, “Technoterrorists: Growing Links Between
Computer Technology and the Seedy Underworld of Terrorism,
Organized Crime, and Spying.” Computer Talk, June 19. 1989, D.
17 – Interview: DISA Center for Information System Security,
November 3, 1993.
18 – United States Senate, A Lesson of the Gulf War: National
Security Requires Computer Security, June 19, 1991, Subcommittee
on Government Information and Regulation, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC: USGPO.